

The paradox of Prabowo-Gibran's agrarian policy in 2025 – rejecting correction, reproducing crisis

2025 Indonesia Land and
Resource Conflict Monitoring Report

Part of Land Watch Asia Initiative on
Land Conflict Monitoring



Cover design and images: Open AI (2026) Gemini, 17 March 2026 version

Citation

Wijaya, B., and Naibaho, J.M. (2026). *The paradox of Prabowo-Gibran's agrarian policy in 2025 — rejecting correction, reproducing crisis: 2025 Indonesia Land and Resource Conflict Monitoring Report*. Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA). [Paper prepared as part of the Land Watch Asia (LWA) campaign convened by the Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC)].

How has the Prabowo–Gibran administration implemented agrarian reform in its first year in office? We describe it as a year of paradox. This term reflects a profound deviation in the implementation of agrarian reform over the past year.

At the outset, the administration gave rise to a sense of optimism. Reading the direction and design of national development through the Asta Cita agenda, it did not seem excessive to harbor hopes for improvement. President Prabowo's stated ambitions — to achieve food and energy self-sufficiency, eradicate poverty, reduce social inequality, and improve public welfare — should have provided momentum for the realization of genuine agrarian reform.

However, as time passed, expectations drifted further from reality. The grand Vision and Mission articulated by President Prabowo in Asta Cita have, in practice, moved in the opposite direction of the Constitution and agrarian reform. Rather than placing the people at the center, these programs have been implemented through an approach marked by the centralization of power and the massive involvement of the military.

In practical terms, military involvement has indeed accelerated the execution of strategic programs. Yet this acceleration has come at a significant cost. The participatory and democratic principles that should animate so-called “people-centered” programs have gradually disappeared. The culture of dialogue and deliberation in shaping development agenda has been replaced by a one-way command system.

As a result, these strategic programs have brought disaster upon the people. Agrarian conflicts arising from land grabbing and forced evictions have intensified and expanded. Communities are increasingly displaced from their lands to satisfy the State's appetite for land acquisition in support of ambitious development projects. The interests of the people are pitted against so-called national interests, producing repression in many regions.

Throughout 2025, the Indonesian people have demonstrated resistance to this situation. The populace has witnessed consecutive waves of popular struggle across the country. These demonstrations that took place were an accumulation of public anger toward the policies and performance of State officials, which have never been on the side of the people.

The wave of popular resistance — particularly from rural areas — stems from a fundamental issue: extreme inequality in the control of land and the means of production, concentrated in the hands of a small elite of economic and political actors. This inequality has generated widening socio-economic gaps between poor peasants and communities on one hand, and a small group of ultra-wealthy individuals — many of whom also wield political power — on the other.

As 2025 drew to a close, Indonesia was once again struck by tragedy. Three provinces in Sumatra — Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra — were simultaneously hit by flash floods and landslides. Thousands lost their lives, tens of thousands of homes and buildings were swept away, and millions were displaced. This catastrophe constituted a stark warning to the government: a structured and systematic crime had taken place, giving rise to a prolonged agrarian crisis. Without immediate and serious corrective action, more people would become victims.

The Special Committee on the Resolution of Agrarian Conflicts (*Panitia Khusus Penyelesaian Konflik Agraria* — Pansus PKA), established by the DPR RI in 2 October 2025, can serve as an entry point to unravel Indonesia's deeply rooted agrarian problems. This committee must act swiftly to produce political and legal breakthroughs to overcome the stagnation of agrarian reform — addressing overlapping policies, institutional failures, budgetary constraints, and flawed implementation on the ground. Through its oversight and evaluation functions, the committee should act as a catalyst for genuine agrarian reform, in accordance with the mandate of MPR Decree No. IX/2001 on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law.

This 2025 Year-End Report of the Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA) presents an account of agrarian conflicts, agrarian reform policies, and the implementation of agrarian reform for the year. It is offered as an effort to support collective reflection and evaluation — particularly as a corrective intervention against national agrarian policies that have yet to deliver justice for the people.

KPA hopes that this report will be useful in analyzing the structural agrarian problems confronting Indonesia. Also, the report can serve as an inspiration to all stakeholders to drive a broad-based transformation of national agrarian policy — one that truly prioritizes the interests of the people.

Land Conflict Monitoring Report on Indonesia

Framework, methodology, and data sources

This Year-End Report is the result of monitoring, data collection, and analysis of Indonesia's national agrarian situation throughout 2025, encompassing agrarian conflicts on the ground, regulatory developments, and the implementation of agrarian reform during the year.

This annual monitoring report presented: 1) a national portrait of current agrarian conditions based on field-level events throughout the year; 2) comprehensive data and analysis of agrarian conflicts grounded in KPA's field findings and advocacy experience; 3) policy analysis derived from desk studies and practical experience in agrarian reform advocacy; 4) alternative data to build public awareness of the ongoing agrarian crisis and human rights violations related to land rights in Indonesia; 5) strengthened emergency response mechanisms to address agrarian violence; and, 6) policy recommendations emphasizing the urgency of agrarian reform and effective conflict resolution mechanisms, including improvements in government and security force practices.

In this report, agrarian conflict refers to structural agrarian conflicts resulting from policies or decisions issued by public officials and/or State authorities. These policies or decisions have wide-ranging impacts in terms of scale, number of affected communities, and the extent of impacted areas. Based on this, the report excludes individual land disputes, inheritance disputes, corporate disputes, or conflicts between government agencies that do not constitute structural agrarian conflicts.

Such agrarian conflicts generated multidimensional consequences, including social, economic, cultural, ecological, and political impacts. The concept of structural agrarian conflict used here refers to practices of land grabbing or unilateral claims by the State and/or corporations over community land, facilitated by

legal frameworks and driven by elite political and business interests. Accordingly, the primary actors responsible for agrarian conflicts included large-scale business entities (State-owned or private), government institutions, and security forces. The victims were peasants, indigenous peoples, fisherfolks, rural and coastal communities, and the urban poor.

The term agrarian as used in this report referred not only to land issues. Based on Article 33 (3) of the 1945 Constitution and Law No. 5 of 1960 on Basic Agrarian Law, agrarian matters were defined as encompassing land, water, airspace, and the natural resources contained therein. This included surface land, subsurface resources, and resources above ground.

Thus, the sectors monitored and analyzed in this report extended beyond land alone and encompassed the full agrarian domain. Policy analysis therefore addressed development policies and government programs across sectors that generate conflicts between communities and the State, security forces, and/or business actors. Sectorally, this report covered: 1) plantation and agribusiness, 2) forestry, 3) mining, 4) infrastructure development, 5) property and real estate, and 6) military facilities. From a landscape perspective, it included a) agriculture and aquaculture, b) settlements and housing, c) customary territories, and d) coastal and fishing grounds.

The monitoring and data collection methods employed in this report were based on the number of agrarian conflict incidents occurring within a given area over the course of the year. Conflicts that emerged in previous years have been included if new incidents occurred (e.g., continued evictions, criminalization, or acts of violence that triggered protests by affected communities). As such, a single conflict area may experience multiple incidents within a single reporting year.

The reporting period for this report covered 01 January 2025 to 31 December 2025.

The data presented in this report were derived from multiple sources, including: 1) direct complaints from communities affected by agrarian conflicts submitted to KPA at the national and regional levels; 2) reports received through the agrarian emergency response and monitoring system of the National Committee for Agrarian Reform (KNPA); 3) field investigations and studies conducted in cases directly accompanied or advocated by KPA; 4) monitoring of national and local mass media across print, digital, and audio-visual platforms; 5) verified social media monitoring; and, 6) specifically for the province of Papua, collaboration with the Pusaka Bentala Rakyat Foundation in data collection.

Table 1. Sources of information for the cases

Source	Number	Percentage (%)
Mainstream media (print, online, radio) and verified social media	262	77
Community, community-based organization	48	14
CSO/NGO	31	9
Total	341	100

Prior to analysis, all data underwent a validation process through cross-checking across sources and the use of comparative data to prevent errors and double counting, and to enhance data validity, reliability, and quality. In several cases, further field investigations and interviews were conducted to verify information and minimize analytical errors.

Despite these efforts, the data and analysis presented may not capture all agrarian conflicts and incidents of violence that occurred in 2025. Limitations remain due to organizational capacity and resource constraints in monitoring and documenting incidents nationwide. In several cases, there were also limitation in terms of the completeness and types of information/data required: case chronologies, details of violence, gender-based data, problem typologies, and other details related to the conflicts that KPA analyzed.

General Overview of Agrarian Conflict in 2025

It is like a driver who realized he was on the wrong side of the road and yet pressed the accelerator even harder: this was how the Prabowo–Gibran administration pursued agrarian policy in 2025. The slogan “*Let’s hit the gas*” had frequently been used as a symbol of acceleration. Yet what had been accelerated was not the correction of unequal land control, but rather the repetition of old schemes: large-scale concessions, forest clearing for oil palm plantations, the opening of forest areas for food estate projects, and the relaxation of licensing requirements in the name of investment. The accelerator had been pressed harder, while the direction of policy remained unchanged.

The implementation of agrarian policy revealed the face of a paradox of power. Ironically, before becoming President, General Prabowo Subianto once authored a book titled *Indonesia’s Paradox and Its Solutions*. However, rather than dismantling that paradox, his administration had consciously preserved it. Thus, 2025 must be read as the year in which this paradox was institutionalized.

This report served as both an expression of concern and an evaluation of the implementation of President Prabowo’s Asta Cita program — a set of political promises he presented prior to his election. Over the past year, many of the policies implemented diverged from those promises, and even ran counter to the spirit of the Constitution and agrarian reform.

In his policy design, President Prabowo advanced an ambitious vision of realizing “Golden Indonesia 2045.” This vision imagined a strong and advanced Indonesia with high per capita income, zero poverty, reduced social inequality, and enhanced human resource competitiveness.

Reflected in the Second Asta Cita, this ambition emphasized strengthening national defense and security while simultaneously promoting national self-reliance through food, energy, water self-sufficiency in the context of creative, green, and blue economy. A similar spirit could be found in the Sixth Asta Cita, which placed development as originating from villages and grassroots communities at the center of economic equity and poverty alleviation. In principle, these two Asta Cita agenda provided vast space for agrarian reform to serve as their foundation. However, that expectation was not realized in 2025.

President Prabowo had governed through three primary approaches: a) the centralization of power through command-oriented and centralized policies; b) State capitalism; and, c) militarism.



Power had been centralized through command-driven policies. The economic system had been managed according to the logic of State capitalism. Political stability had been maintained and administered through a militaristic approach, with the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the National Police (POLRI) as key actors.

These three approaches were clearly visible in political-legal dynamics, policy formulation, and the implementation of priority programs throughout the administration of President Prabowo. The government established Daya Agata Nusantara (Danantara) to consolidate the control of the central government, the national elite, and the military over projects and investments in food self-sufficiency, energy down streaming, the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program, cooperatives, large-scale investment, and National Strategic Projects. Danantara functioned as a strategic State-owned investment management body — similar to a sovereign wealth fund — tasked with consolidating and optimizing State-owned enterprise assets through investment in strategic and so-called sustainable projects to stimulate national economic growth.

The executive power had become increasingly concentrated. The Prabowo–Gibran administration operated with minimal opposition, supported by a dominant parliamentary coalition. At the same time, narratives of nationalism and unity were manipulated to legitimize the centralization of power, framing public participation and community interests as being in opposition to national unity, security, and national interest. As a result, government policies and programs proceeded with little substantive oversight or criticism.

Command-based approach and the massive involvement of the military in civilian affairs had intensified. President Prabowo had governed with an emphasis on order and national stability. This logic translated into widespread military involvement across various sectors and civilian domains, resulting in a shrinking of civic space and democratic practice.

Democratic processes were gradually being undermined in the name of efficiency. Public participation and the role of local governments in policymaking, budgetary politics, strategic program design, and the issuance of permits and concessions were curtailed under the pretext of efficiency.

The path toward Golden Indonesia as promoted by President Prabowo through these approaches had deepened Indonesia's economic, social, and political crises. Thus, the country continues to grapple with chronic agrarian problems and structural land injustices that have plagued the nation for decades, with no meaningful signs of improvement.

Land grabbing and the forced displacement of communities from their territories had persisted across the country. The monopolization of land, plantations, forests, and mines; the parceling of seas and small islands; the reckless exploitation of natural wealth; and, environmental destruction by a small group of conglomerates continued unabated. Worse still, amid these agrarian crimes, people faced threats to their freedom of association, criminalization, violence, and even loss of life due to the reckless actions of State security forces. Such violence has not only persisted but increased, in parallel with the expanded involvement of the TNI and POLRI across agrarian development sectors.

In mid-August, waves of resistance erupted simultaneously across various regions of Indonesia. These were not merely expressions of anger toward officials who lacked empathy amid public hardship. More deeply, they represented the culmination of popular exhaustion with increasingly acute structural problems. The President and the DPR RI have failed to address the root causes driving people toward despair and rage.

During National Peasants' Day on 24 September 2025, the KPA, together with 24,000 peasants, fisherfolk, indigenous peoples, women, students, and labor, organized coordinated national actions in Jakarta and across multiple regions. On this occasion, KPA presented 24 structural agrarian problems and nine demands for reform. These demands were not merely annual ceremonial appeals, but reminders to State authorities of the daily reality in which people's land and natural wealth continue to be seized and plundered.

The flash floods and landslides that struck Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra toward the end of the year constituted a severe warning to the government. These disasters reflected structured and systematic agrarian crimes that produced a prolonged crisis. They were not merely natural disasters, but ecological disasters resulting from the expanding agrarian crisis in Indonesia.

This is the trajectory of agrarian reform and national agrarian political-legal dynamics throughout 2025, marking the first year of the Prabowo–Gibran administration.

Key findings

Affected Population and Areas of Conflict

President Prabowo's command authority had never been used to prevent the escalation of agrarian conflicts across Indonesia. On the contrary, this authority had been exercised to encourage the active involvement of the TNI and the POLRI in handling agrarian conflicts. The Prabowo–Gibran administration had made no meaningful breakthroughs in addressing either newly emerging agrarian conflicts or long-standing agrarian conflicts that persisted for decades in Indonesia.

Throughout 2025, agrarian conflicts continued to escalate sharply. KPA recorded at least 341 outbreaks of agrarian conflicts, covering an area of 914,574.96 hectares and affecting 123,612 peasant households across 428 villages nationwide. This figure represented an increase of 15 percent compared to 2024. Not only did the number of agrarian conflict incidents increase, but the geographic spread of affected villages also expanded significantly. In the previous year (2024), agrarian conflicts occurred in 349 villages (i.e., lower than 79 villages).

Table 2a. Total number of cases, area contested, and households affected by land and resource conflicts, 2025

Ongoing cases	Number
Total number of cases	341
Total number of hectares contested	914,574.96 hectares
Total number of households affected	123,612 households

Over the past five years, the trend of agrarian conflict outbreaks had shown a consistent upward trajectory. This escalation is the result of unresolved long-standing agrarian conflicts intersecting with new conflicts generated by development and investment policies imposed by the State.

President Prabowo's policy of strengthening and expanding military dominance in food development projects, energy projects, and forest area enforcement had also been a major factor behind the significant increase in agrarian conflict outbreaks in 2025.

Distribution of Agrarian Conflict in Indonesia

Throughout the year, agrarian conflicts erupted in 33 of Indonesia's 38 provinces, indicating that agrarian conflict had become a near-nationwide phenomenon. However, due to the limitations of the methods employed by KPA, the actual distribution of agrarian conflicts might be broader than reflected in this report.

For 2025, West Java recorded the highest number of conflicts, with 39 cases covering 2,894.90 hectares and affecting 6,891 families. This was followed by North Sumatra with 36 cases covering 52,065.09 hectares and affecting 2,613 families. South Papua recorded 23 cases covering 239,262.90 hectares. Jakarta experienced 21 conflicts affecting 4,746 families across 1,021.78 hectares, while South Sulawesi recorded 20 cases covering 33,289.93 hectares.

Table 2b. Number of cases and total area contested (in ha) by province

Provinces	Number of cases	Area (ha)
West Java	39	2,894.90
North Sumatra	36	52,065.09
South Papua	23	239,262.90
Jakarta	21	1,021.78
South Sulawesi	20	33,289.93
East Kalimantan	19	7,412.25
Central Java	15	621.20
Riau	14	220,856.40
Jambi	13	3,197.00
Riau Islands	11	16,693.60
North Moluccas	10	19,759.00
Banten	9	6,378.00
West Kalimantan	9	139,634.43
East Nusa Tenggara	9	16.70
Center Sulawesi	8	17,724.00
Southeast Sulawesi	8	5,138.10
Lampung	7	35,400.23
North Sulawesi	7	677.40

Provinces	Number of cases	Area (ha)
Yogyakarta	6	6.00
East Java	6	4,181.18
Central Kalimantan	6	1,183.60
North Kalimantan	6	32,078.00
Moluccas	6	1,832.31
West Sulawesi	6	769.85
Aceh	6	5,000.00
West Nusa Tenggara	5	No data available
West Sumatera	4	47,706.00
Bengkulu	3	600.00
South Sumatera	3	1,000.00
South Kalimantan	2	No data available
Southwest Papua	2	13,136.00
Bali	1	No data available
Bangka Belitung	1	5,039.11
Total	341	914,574.96

For 2025, 42 cases have been in existence for 20 years or more. About 39 cases are ongoing from 10 to 19 years. There are 29 cases that have existed for less than two years. However, 200 cases have unknown duration. It is safe to assume that these 200 cases are at least 10 years old since they happened during the administration of former President Jokowi.

Table 3. Duration of Land and Resource Conflicts by Number of Years

# of Years	Number
Less than two years	29
2 to less than 5 years	11
5 to less than 10 years	20
10 to less than 15 years	12
15 to less than 20 years	27
20 years or more	42
Unknown	200
Total	341

Affected land and sectors by land conflict

Lands used for smallholder agriculture had the most number of recorded cases at 188, where at least 107,099 farming families were affected by agrarian conflicts, involving 398,646.45 hectares of agricultural land. Meanwhile, agrarian conflicts (57 cases) occurring in indigenous territories had the most number of lands affected with an area of 500,637.31 hectares. Conflicts also affected fishing and aquaculture areas, totaling 12,960.26 hectares, which were the livelihoods of 1,123 fishing families.

Finally, agrarian conflicts in residential areas impacted 2,430.82 hectares, affecting 13,920 families. In sum, agrarian conflicts throughout 2025 increasingly threatened agricultural and food security, assuming that indigenous territories also function as local food production centers that historically supported national food sufficiency.

Table 4a. Types of land and resource affected by conflicts

Type of land/resource	Number of cases	Percent of cases (%)	Contested area (ha)	Percent of contested area (%)
Smallholder agriculture/farming	188	55.1	398,546.45	43.6
Housing and settlements	84	24.7	2,430.92	0.3
Indigenous people/customary land/ancestral domain	57	16.7	500,637.31	54.7
Water/fisheries resources	12	3.5	12,960.28	1.4
Total	341	100	914,574.96	100

In terms of number of cases recorded, 329 (96 percent) involved land while water/fisheries resources accounted for 12 cases (four percent).

Table 4b. Conflicts involving land and waters, by number of cases and total area contested (in ha)

	Number of cases	Total area contested (ha)
Land/land resources	329	901,614.68
Water/fisheries resources	12	12,960.28
Total	341	914,574.96

In terms of affected sectors, smallholder farmers accounted the highest number of recorded cases with 188, followed by urban poor communities (84 cases), then by indigenous peoples (57), and fisherfolk (12 cases).

One of the agrarian conflicts that occurred on community food and agricultural land involved the unilateral operation of PT Setia Agro Abadi (SAA) in Mahakam Ulu Regency, East Kalimantan. The palm oil company seized 6,101 hectares of community farmland in Tri Pariq Makmur Village, much of which had certified ownership titles. Potential conflicts due to PT SAA's operations were also identified in four other villages — Long Hubung Ulu, Matalibaq, Memahak Teboq, and Wana Pariq — totaling nearly 20,000 hectares of disputed land.

In Labuhan Batu Regency, North Sumatra, two peasant groups — Mekar Tani and Serbaguna D in Kuala Bangka Village, Kualuh Hilir Subdistrict - were in conflict with PT Torganda. The company took over 3,423 hectares of indigenous territories and productive community farmland to develop oil palm plantations. This conflict prevented hundreds of families from continuing their farming activities.

These agrarian conflicts in indigenous territories, agricultural areas, and fishing grounds demonstrated the lack of strong political commitment from the government to protect community farmland and food systems. Amid President Prabowo's rhetoric and ambition for national food self-sufficiency, the government continued to allow community agricultural land and food sources to be threatened by investment interests and national strategic projects.

The government had gradually moved away from people-centered agricultural and food systems. At the policy level, through the Job Creation Law (UU Cipta Kerja), the government opened opportunities for the conversion of sustainable farmland in the name of National Strategic Projects (PSN). To address the ongoing food crisis, the government had instead opened indigenous territories and forests, as well as confiscated community farmland to develop large-scale, corporate-operated agriculture (food estate).

Table 5. Primary sector or community affected by conflict, by number and percent of cases

Primary sector or community affected by conflict	Number of cases	Percent of cases (%)
Farmers: peasants (landless smallholder farmers, sharecroppers, agricultural workers, tenants, lessees, small owners)	188	55.1
Urban poor communities	84	24.7
Indigenous people	57	16.7
Fisherfolk	12	3.5
Total	341	100

Adversarial Claimants and Drivers of Agrarian Conflict

Throughout 2025, KPA observed the involvement of multiple actors, ranging from business entities, State-owned enterprises, central and regional government programs, to specialized agencies established to implement various strategic and national priority projects.

Private corporations at regional, national, and international levels triggered 217 agrarian conflict cases (64 percent), affecting a total area of 817,490.86 hectares and impacting 37,910 families. Various government entities followed at 100 cases (29 percent) and State security agents at 24 cases (seven percent) as adversarial claimants.

In particular, unilateral operations and land claims by State-owned enterprises (SOEs) on community land resulted in 51 conflict incidents, covering 20,469.43 hectares and affecting 2,717 families. Agrarian conflicts between government authorities (central and regional) and local communities occurred in 34 cases, spanning 46,161.72 hectares and impacting 3,923 families. Conflicts between communities and the military amounted to 24 incidents, affecting 5,894.48 hectares and 68,934 families.

Table 6. Adversarial claimants in land conflict, by number and percent of cases

Adversarial claimants	Number of cases	Percent of cases (%)
Private companies	217	64
Government	100	29
• State enterprises	51	15
• Government agencies	15	4
• Local Government	28	8
• Both National and Local Governments	6	2
State security agents	24	7
Total	341	100

In terms of drivers of agrarian conflicts, recorded data in 2025 were predominantly private-led business enterprises (217 out of 341 cases or 64 percent) affecting 817,490.86 hectares — concentrated in the agribusiness, plantation, and mining industries. Government programs accounted for 71 cases (21 percent) of agrarian conflicts, followed by State-owned enterprises with 51 cases (14.9 percent) and conservation projects with two cases (0.1 percent).

Table 7. Drivers of land and resource conflict, by number of cases and contested area (in ha)

Drivers of land and resource conflict	Number of cases	Contested area (ha)
Private-led business enterprises	217	817,490.86
• Agribusiness, plantations	103	331,339.65
• Mining, quarrying	42	51,865.57
• Property/housing/real estate development	23	1,288.44
• Tourism, ecotourism	8	203.40
• Industry/manufacturing/ production	6	8,036.00
• Logging and tree plantation	28	390,947.80
• Power generation and transmission	2	27,700.00
• Others	5	6,110.00
Government programs	71	32,122.67
• Public Infrastructure	14	16,818.47
• Public utilities (dams, power lines, power/energy, irrigation, etc.)	18	53.79
• Military facilities	24	5,894.48
• Others	15	9,356
Government-led business/State enterprises	51	20,469.43
Conservation/Protected Areas and “No Go” Zones	2	44,492.00
Total	341	914,574.96

Plantation and agribusiness sector

Overall, agrarian conflicts in the plantation sector increased by 21 percent compared to 2024. This trend demonstrated that the plantation concession (HGU) moratorium announced and implemented by the Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency was insufficient, as it was not accompanied by the revocation of problematic HGUs. Such concessions violated the law and overlapped with community land which had previously been issued by the State.

Agrarian conflicts in the plantation sector were largely driven by oil palm plantation operations, which accounted for 74 conflict incidents (45 percent of total plantation-related conflicts), covering an area of 111,458.96 hectares and affecting 7,477 peasant households. This was followed by sugarcane plantation operations, which generated 25 conflict incidents affecting 222,669 hectares.

One example of plantation-related agrarian conflict in 2025 occurred in Central Sulawesi, involving peasants from five villages in East Petasia Subdistrict and PT Agro Nusa Abadi (ANA), a subsidiary of PT Astra Agro Lestari (AAL). In March 2025, eight community members were once again summoned by the North Morowali Police on allegations of theft of oil palm fruit on land claimed by PT ANA. The community viewed these actions as a form of criminalization against peasants defending their land from corporate expansion. In addition to operating on community land, the company reportedly did not possess a valid HGU. The company was also accused of deliberately fostering divisions within the community.

Conflicts related to sugarcane plantations also occurred in South Papua, involving the indigenous Yei People in Merauke and PT Murni Nusantara Mandiri (MNM). This sugarcane plantation formed part of a National Strategic Project for food and energy security. The majority of the Yei community, particularly members of the Kwipalo and Noya clans, had strongly rejected the project, which they considered a large-scale seizure of indigenous land and forests. PT MNM owned a concession covering 52,700 hectares - an area comparable to the size of Jakarta Province. As of August 2025, the company had cleared 4,912 hectares of indigenous land and forest. This land seizure had been accompanied by violence and criminalization of community members, including Vincent Kwipalo when he stopped company excavators and bulldozers on 15 September 2025 during road construction activities in indigenous territory.

Sugarcane plantation projects under the energy security agenda were not only operated by private companies but also by State-owned enterprises. In Takalar Regency, South Sulawesi, PT Perkebunan Nusantara XIV (PTPN XIV) carried out forced evictions against local communities, with the conflict escalating throughout the year. The company repeatedly destroyed community crops and farmland, accompanied by intimidation and violence. This conflict dated back to 1978, when PTPN seized 6,650 hectares of community land across 11 villages in Polongbangkeng and North Polongbangkeng Subdistricts to establish sugarcane plantations. Although PTPN's HGU expired in 2024, the company attempted to reassert control over land that had since been cultivated by residents. This conflict is closely linked to the government's sugar self-sufficiency program.

Infrastructure Sector

In 2025, the infrastructure sector accounted for 69 recorded agrarian conflict incidents, covering a total area of 59,809.42 hectares and affecting 12,786 households. Conflicts in this sector were primarily associated with tourism infrastructure development, the construction of industrial estates, and the development of public facilities.

A conflict between a special authority and residents occurred, for example, between thousands of street vendors in the Borobudur Tourism Area and PT Taman Wisata Candi (TWC). PT TWC is the company managing the Borobudur Tourism Area under In Journey, a special authority established to develop the National Strategic Tourism Area (KSPN). PT TWC relocated nearly 2,000 vendors from Zone 2 of Borobudur to Kampung Seni Borobudur, located in Dusun Kujon, Zone 3 on the west side of the temple. The clearance of stalls and relocation of Borobudur vendors were reported to the Central Java Ombudsman in November 2024. The Ombudsman recorded that 324 vendors had not yet received stall rights at Kampung Seni Borobudur.

Mining Sector

Conflicts in the mining sector were predominantly linked to nickel mining operations, which accounted for 16 conflict incidents, followed by coal mining with 12 incidents. Geothermal projects and sand mining operations each contributed four conflict incidents.

Frequently promoted as part of Indonesia's clean energy transition, conditions on the ground had demonstrated that extractive practices of nickel mining remained largely unchanged. Behind the narrative of renewable and transition energy, mining operations continued to rely on land acquisition, displacement, and environmentally destructive practices that intensified agrarian conflict, social tension, and ecological degradation.

Property and Real Estate Sector

Most conflicts in property and real estate sector were caused by housing development (including the government's three-million-housing program) and real estate projects, accounting for 23 cases. This was followed by unilateral claims over community-managed land and agricultural areas by government asset holders in 10 cases, with the remaining conflicts arising from the construction of office complexes (two cases) and shopping centers (one case).

One significant case occurred in Sabah Balau Village, Tanjung Bintang Subdistrict, South Lampung, where residents were forcibly evicted by the Provincial Government of Lampung under the pretext of State asset enforcement. The affected communities rejected the eviction, questioning its legal basis, as the land remained under dispute and no final court ruling had authorized execution. The eviction escalated into violent confrontation, with several residents choosing to remain on-site as excavators demolished their homes. Security forces responded with coercive measures, forcibly removing residents, resulting in injuries.

Another major incident took place in Pulo Gebang Subdistrict, Cakung, East Jakarta, on 12 February 2025.

Hundreds of homes were demolished following an eviction operation led by the Jakarta District Court, supported by joint security forces consisting of the military, police, and municipal public order officers. The eviction affected residential areas covering approximately 3.8 hectares. Residents protested the operation, citing the absence of clear procedures, meaningful consultation, and adequate legal safeguards prior to demolition. Ironically, the eviction of residents in the Perumnas Pulo Gebang area formed part of the government's three-million-home housing development program.

Forestry Sector

Agrarian conflicts in this sector were once again dominated by the control of Industrial Timber Plantations (HTI) by forestry corporations, with 22 cases covering an area of 360,491.80 hectares (84 percent). This was followed by conflicts related to forest concession rights (HPH), accounting for six cases, while production forests and national parks each recorded one case.

Overall, agrarian conflicts in the forestry sector increased in 2025 compared to the previous year. The sharp increase in forestry-related agrarian conflict was primarily driven by the expansion and control of Industrial Timber Plantations (HTI) operated by forestry corporations. While only 14 HTI-related conflict cases were recorded in 2024, this figure rose to 22 cases in the current reporting period. This increase was partly attributable to the implementation of the Forest Area Enforcement Policy (Penertiban Kawasan Hutan/PKH), which had generated heightened tensions with communities already in conflict with corporate HTI control.

A long-standing agrarian conflict in the forestry sector involves the Sihaporas indigenous community and PT Toba Pulp Paper (TPL). This conflict, which has persisted for more than three decades, escalated again following an attack on community members on 22 September 2025. Thousands of individuals, allegedly acting on behalf of the company, suddenly attacked residents in Buttu Pangaturan, Simalungun Regency. The violent assault caused injuries to 33 people, 18 of whom were women. The attack also led to the destruction of the community's struggle post, farming shelters, homes, and vehicles. Throughout the year, PT TPL reportedly carried out repeated attacks and unilateral evictions of community farmland. These actions occurred in the absence of firm or effective responses from government authorities.

Military Facilities Sector

Throughout 2025, agrarian conflicts resulting from unilateral military land claims and military involvement in advancing government programs led to 24 recorded conflicts, covering an area of 5,894.48 hectares and affecting 68,934 households. These conflicts were primarily driven by unilateral military claims over community land and settlements, accounting for 17 cases, and forced evictions for the development of Combat Training Centers (Puslatpur), which accounted for four cases.

In aggregate, agrarian conflicts linked to military land claims increased by up to 300 percent compared to 2024, when only six agrarian conflict cases were recorded. This sharp increase was due to the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) involvement in several government priority programs, including the food security program, the Forest Area Enforcement Task Force (Satgas PKH), the establishment of new military regional commands, and the deployment of Territorial Development Battalions (BTP) across multiple regions.

Other land resource conflicts are driven by land grabbing that involves government program including for national strategic projects, special economic zones, the Land Bank projects, food estates, national tourism strategic areas, and the new capital city which have generated thousands of agrarian conflicts and widespread environmental destruction. Projects that overlap with people's land must be returned to the framework of agrarian reform.

Incidents of human rights violations and reported perpetrators

Year after year, the patterns and approaches to handling agrarian conflict areas remained unchanged — still discriminatory and repressive. Cases of violence and legal discrimination (criminalization) in agrarian conflict zones continued to increase. A key factor driving the rising trend of violence and criminalization in handling agrarian conflicts was the growing involvement of the military in land acquisition programs and government strategic projects.

Table 8. Human Rights Violations (HRVs)

Incidents of HRVs	Number Incidents	Number of Victims
Against individuals	122	736 individuals
Against communities	219	123,612 households
Total	341	

Throughout 2025, at least 122 incidents of human rights violations (HRVs) against individuals were recorded, where 736 people were victims of violence and criminalization in agrarian conflict areas, including 135 women and 601 men. Among them, 404 people were criminalized (19 women and 385 men), 19 people were shot (two women and 17 men), 312 people were physically assaulted (114 women and 198 men), and a person was killed.

With regard to HRVs committed against communities, the 2025 data revealed 219 incidents affecting 123,612 households.

One of the shooting incidents this year involved a female peasant in Pasinan Village, Lekok Subdistrict, Pasuruan Regency, East Java. The victim was shot by members of the 15th Battalion of the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL). The case began as a land dispute between residents of 10 villages and the TNI AL, which planned to build a battalion and a school. Residents rejected the plan because only 379 hectares were allocated for the relocation of 67,000 families.

In North Luwu Regency, 17 Rampi indigenous people were criminalized for rejecting mining by PT Kalla Arebama. The community's resistance arose because the company's operations had destroyed rice fields, gardens, sacred sites, and cemeteries that are the sources of livelihood and identity for the Rampi indigenous people.

In South Konawe, three peasants from the Angata Peasants Group suffered serious injuries after being assaulted by employees of PT Marketindo Selaras. The conflict originated from the operation of a 1,300-hectare palm oil plantation owned by a subsidiary of the Artha Graha Group, which seized community land.

In Deli Serdang, Rahmad Dani was shot dead, an incident linked to an escalating agrarian conflict between residents and PTPN II that culminated in clashes. His death highlighted the prolonged nature of agrarian conflicts between communities and State-owned plantations.

Table 9. Forms of HRVs committed against individuals, by number of incidents and number of victims

Type of HRVs	No. of incidents	Number of individual victims		
		Male	Female	Total
Labelling, branding, “red-tagging”, criminalization	72	385	19	404
Assault/Physical injury	42	198	114	312
Torture	7	17	2	19
Killing/Murder	1	1		1
Total	122	601	135	736

Note: The recorded type of HRV reflects the most recent violation inflicted on the victim.

Compared to 2024, cases of criminalization and violence in agrarian conflict areas rose significantly by 32 percent in 2025.

Community protests — arising from public officials issuing permits and concessions on community land — were framed by government as a security issue rather than addressing structural problems. Instead of holding ministers or officials accountable, the government typically deployed thousands of fully armed security personnel during mobilizations.

The cases of criminalization and violence against individuals throughout 2025 still involved traditional actors in agrarian conflict management, such as the Police, TNI (Indonesian military), and Satpol PP (Public Order Agency), accounting for 59 percent (72 cases). On the other hand, private companies were reported as the perpetrators of 50 cases (41 percent).

The State security agents are frequently unjust and biased toward corporate interests rather than affected communities. This positioning stems from a legal-formalistic perspective and discriminatory law enforcement practices toward peasants and local communities. The use of a military approach in handling agrarian conflicts demonstrates the State’s failure to recognize and address the root causes of these conflicts.

Table 10. Reported perpetrators of HRVs against individuals, by number of incidents and percentage

Reported perpetrators of HRVs against communities	Number of incidents	Percentage (%)
State security agents	72	59
Private companies	50	41
Total	122	100

Throughout 2025, the escalation of agrarian conflicts has become increasingly concerning, particularly due to threats to peasants (food producers) and agricultural communities in Indonesia. At least 107,099 farming families were affected by 98 cases of agrarian conflicts, involving 398,646.45 hectares of agricultural land.

Meanwhile, 47 agrarian conflicts occurring in indigenous territories affected 1,470 households, covering an area of 500,637.31 hectares. Conflicts also affected 67 agrarian conflicts in residential areas which affected 2,430.82 hectares and 13,920 families. Finally, seven incidents affected fishing and aquaculture areas, totaling 12,960.26 hectares and impacting the livelihoods of 1,123 fishing families.

One of the agrarian conflicts occurring on community food and agricultural land involved the unilateral operation of PT Setia Agro Abadi (SAA) in Mahakam Ulu Regency, East Kalimantan. The palm oil company seized 6,101 hectares of community farmland in Tri Pariq Makmur Village, much of which had certified ownership titles. Potential conflicts due to PT SAA's operations were also identified in five other villages — Long Hubung Ulu, Matalibaq, Memahak Teboq, and Wana Pariq — totaling nearly 20,000 hectares of disputed land.

In Labuhan Batu Regency, North Sumatra, two peasant groups — Mekar Tani and Serbaguna D in Kuala Bangka Village, Kualuh Hilir Subdistrict — were in conflict with PT Torganda. The company took over 3,423 hectares of indigenous territories and productive community farmland to develop palm oil plantations. This conflict has prevented hundreds of families from continuing their farming activities.

In sum, agrarian conflicts throughout 2025 increasingly threaten agricultural system and food security, considering that indigenous territories also function as local food production centers that have historically supported national food sufficiency.

These agrarian conflicts in indigenous territories, agricultural areas, and fishing grounds demonstrated the lack of strong political commitment from the government to protect community farmland and food systems. Amid President Prabowo's rhetoric and ambition for national food self-sufficiency, the government continued to allow community agricultural land and food sources to be threatened by investment interests and national strategic projects.

Gradually moving away from people-centered agricultural and food systems, the government opened opportunities for the conversion of sustainable farmland in the name of National Strategic Projects (PSN) through the Job Creation Law (UU Cipta Kerja). To address the ongoing food crisis, the government instead opened indigenous territories and forests and confiscated community farmland to develop large-scale, corporate-operated agriculture (food estate).

Table 11. Communities affected by HRVs, by number of incidents and number of affected households

Communities affected by HRVs	Number of incidents	Number of affected households
Farmers	98	107,099
Urban poor community	67	13,920
Indigenous people	47	1,470
Fisherfolk	7	1,123
Total	219	123,612

With regard to communities, eviction and displacement were the main form of HRVs with a total of 161 incidents, affecting 116,652 households. For most of the incidents, destruction of crops, homes, & property, physical threats & intimidation, usually precedes and facilitates eviction and displacement. Eviction and displacement follow after destruction of crops, homes, property; and physical threat and other forms of intimidation. Criminalization followed with 58 incidents affecting 6,960 households.

Table 12. Types of HRVs committed against communities, by number of incidents and number of affected households

Type of HRVs committed against communities	Number of incidents	Number of affected households
Eviction, displacement	161	116,652
Labelling, branding, “red-tagging”, criminalization	58	6,960
Total	219	123,612

Private corporations at regional, national, and international levels were seen as triggering 167 agrarian conflict incidents, affecting a total area of 817,490.86 hectares and impacting 37,910 families. On the other hand, State security agents were alleged perpetrators of 52 incidents of HRVs.

Table 13. Reported perpetrators of HRVs committed against communities, by number of incidents and percentage

Reported perpetrators of HRVs against communities	Number of incidents	Percentage (%)
Private companies, private armed groups	167	76
State security agents	52	24
Total	219	100

Responses of affected communities

For 2025, data showed that peaceful demonstrations were undertaken in all of the 341 land conflict cases documented.

Table 14. Responses by communities to address conflict

Responses of Communities to Conflicts	Number of Responses
Peaceful demonstrations/non-violent acts	341
Total	341

Unfortunately, no corrective actions were taken to address any of the cases.

Table 15. Corrective actions to address the conflict

Whether corrective actions were taken to address the conflict case	Number
Yes	--
No/Not yet	341
No information available	--
Total	341

Conclusion and recommendations

The demands for agrarian reform raised by peasants, fisherfolks, indigenous peoples, and women toward the government were by no means excessive. In reality, there are still around 17 million poor peasants who lacked sufficient land to produce and free themselves from poverty. The longer agrarian reform is avoided, the more peasants lose their land. Data from the Statistics Indonesia (BPS) revealed that from 2013 to 2023, the number of land-poor peasants (*petani gurem*) continued to increase.

In commemoration of National Peasants' Day (HTN) 2025, a parliamentary hearing between KPA and the leadership of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI), the Minister of ATR/BPN, the Minister of Forestry, the Minister of Villages, the Acting Minister of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN), the Head of the Executive Office of the President (KSP), and others, confirmed the agrarian crisis. As a result, a special institution shall be established to implement agrarian reform with three main tasks: a) resolving agrarian conflicts, b) redistributing land, and c) developing people's economic livelihoods. This would be followed by monitoring through a Special Committee on Agrarian Conflict Resolution (Pansus PKA) in the DPR with direct community participation.

Unfortunately, after the meeting, ministers - especially those from the Ministry of ATR/BPN and the Ministry of Forestry - had shown no meaningful change in mindset or working methods in resolving agrarian problems and overcoming obstacles to agrarian reform.

KPA then again met with the Minister and Vice Minister of Forestry to follow up on the outcomes of the parliamentary hearing. A striking fact emerged regarding the Ministry of Forestry's explanation as to why TORA (Land Objects for Agrarian Reform) originating from forest area releases did not align with grassroots LPRAs (Priority Locations for Agrarian Reform) proposals. According to the Ministry of Forestry, they were merely instructed by the Ministry of ATR to identify "fresh land" (vacant land). As a result of this misunderstanding and lack of policy synchronization between ministries, efforts to correct forest area boundary claims overlapping with villages, settlements, and people's food-producing areas — so that these lands could be freed from concessions and returned to the people — remained entirely absent from their agenda.

Similarly, land redistribution under the Ministry of ATR/BPN did not target land monopolized by business actors that generated conflicts. To date, not a single people-proposed LPRA has been successfully resolved, including agrarian conflicts between communities and private plantation concessions (HGU).

The ten-year trajectory of the Jokowi administration has provided important lessons for Indonesia regarding the gap between political promises and their implementation. It demonstrates that political promises on agrarian reform must be consistent and concrete in their execution on the ground. This means that the Prabowo–Gibran administration must take a firm stance and demonstrate strong political will in advancing agrarian reform.

Agrarian reform in the Asta Cita is positioned as a fundamental foundation for agricultural development. However, in its practical interpretation, agrarian reform has once again been reduced and narrowly translated into a land certification program. Even in the 2025 to 2029 National Medium-Term

Development Plan (RPJMN), only the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN) is assigned responsibility for implementing agrarian reform. In reality, the scope of agrarian reform is far broader, encompassing forestry, maritime affairs, villages, agriculture, public works and housing (PUPR), and many other institutions.

It is therefore crucial for President Prabowo to return to the core readings and principles of agrarian reform and to correct policies that have already been implemented. This is essential so that President Prabowo does not become trapped in continuing the mistakes in agrarian reform implementation that occurred during the ten years of President Joko Widodo's administration.

In his capacity as both Head of State and Head of Government, the President must understand genuine agrarian reform and then lead its implementation in a systemic manner from Aceh to Papua. Agrarian reform is, at its core, an agenda to liberate the Indonesian people from an unequal, exploitative, and dispossessive agrarian system. It is intended to ensure that land and agrarian resources are used to the greatest possible extent for the prosperity and welfare of the people, in accordance with Pancasila and the mandate of the 1945 Constitution.

Throughout 2025, the agrarian crisis - manifested in inequality, agrarian conflicts, poverty, and ecological disasters - has demonstrated that the State can no longer govern using old approaches. The agrarian crisis has become increasingly escalatory and expansive, spreading to new regions, involving a wider range of actors, and exerting deeper impacts on the social, economic, and ecological lives of the people.

Agrarian reform as the way out of the crisis

Without fundamental changes to the structure of land control, all development policies risk continuing to revolve within the same cycle of crisis. As long as this structure is left intact, agrarian conflicts will persist in various forms — whether as disputes, violence, criminalization, or as prolonged poverty and ecological vulnerability.

Agrarian reform is a systematic corrective effort to address this agrarian structure. It must not be positioned as an additional agenda or merely one ideal option among many. The State must place it as the primary — and indeed the only — viable pathway out of the crisis politically, economically, and socially. Moreover, from a legal standpoint, agrarian reform is a constitutional mandate.

In the Indonesian context, the urgency of agrarian reform is becoming increasingly evident as the agrarian crisis has spread into other strategic sectors. Food security cannot be built on unequal agrarian structures in which peasants lose land and access to production. Poverty alleviation will not be effective if the main sources of people's livelihoods remain under constant threat. Likewise, sustainable development agendas will continually confront ecological limits as long as land expansion and resource exploitation continue to be prioritized.

Agrarian reform as a constitutional mandate

The core agrarian problem in Indonesia does not lie in the absence of policies, but in the deviation of State governance from its constitutional mandate. Before the crisis deepens further, the Prabowo–Gibran

administration must immediately return to the constitutional mandate and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) by placing agrarian reform at the foundation of national development, particularly in agrarian, agricultural, and people-centered economic sectors. The government must also recognize that only by strengthening these three sectors can the national economy rest on a solid foundation. Genuine agrarian reform is the only path that President Prabowo must take if Indonesia is to escape the agrarian crisis and move toward a just society, free from poverty, capable of achieving food self-sufficiency and food sovereignty, and realizing a surge in equitable, inclusive economic growth.

KPA data from 2024 shows that 15 provinces identified as epicenters of agrarian conflict are also epicenters of poverty. This is because agrarian conflicts resulting from land grabbing and forced evictions have stripped communities of their sources of livelihood. This situation can only change if the Government of Indonesia genuinely commits to implementing agrarian reform.

The House of Representatives' Special Committee on Agrarian Conflict Resolution as an entry point for agrarian reform

Making agrarian conflict resolution the entry point of agrarian reform requires correcting permits and concessions, restoring community rights, and undertaking ecological restoration. By treating conflict areas as objects of agrarian reform and conflict victims as its subjects, the Special Committee on Agrarian Conflict Resolution (Pansus PKA) can produce tangible impacts on socio-economic recovery.

Restoring access to land for peasants, fisherfolks, and indigenous peoples in conflict areas can directly strengthen the people's productive base, reduce poverty, and lower the potential for violence. This step also sends a political signal that the State is willing to shift its orientation from administratively and legally driven conflict management toward justice-based resolution.

The establishment of the Special Committee on Agrarian Conflict Resolution by the House of Representatives is expected to become a political–legal breakthrough to dismantle obstacles to the implementation of agrarian reform. Amid the mounting number of agrarian conflicts, the performance and innovations of the Pansus PKA are crucial.

The urgency of establishing the National Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency (BP-RAN)

The National Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency (BP-RAN) is an institution whose immediate establishment by the government is highly urgent. The existence of this body would reaffirm that agrarian reform is a cross-sectoral national agenda. With a clear mandate, this agency would be able to lead land redistribution, resolve agrarian conflicts, restore the rights of indigenous peoples, and integrate agrarian reform with food sovereignty, rural economic development, and ecological restoration agenda. Without the establishment of such an institution, commitments to agrarian reform will continue to end as mere promises. Moreover, the absence of such a body results in the lack of a comprehensive, consistent, and binding implementation framework across sectors.

Other recommendations

Based on the structural political, economic, legal, social, and agrarian crises unfolding throughout 2025, agrarian reform is no longer negotiable. Beyond the establishment of the DPR RI Special Committee on Agrarian Conflict Resolution (Pansus PKA) and the formation of the National Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency (BP-RAN), the government must immediately fulfil seven (7) additional demands as follows:

- The President must: a) accelerate agrarian conflict resolution and land redistribution, covering at least 1.76 million hectares of KPA Priority Locations for Agrarian Reform (LPRA); and, b) regulate and redistribute to peasants, farm laborers, fisherfolks, women, and indigenous peoples, some 7.35 million hectares of abandoned land and 26.8 million hectares monopolized by conglomerates, including community lands unilaterally claimed by PTPN, Perhutani/Inhutani, and State forest designations in over 25,000 villages.
- The DPR and the President, together with civil society, must: a) immediately draft and enact an Agrarian Reform Bill (RUU Reforma Agraria); b) revoke the Job Creation Omnibus Law (UU Cipta Kerja) that legalizes land grabbing and food liberalization; and, c) restore agrarian governance in line with Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution.
- The President must fulfill the right to adequate housing for peasants, fisherfolks, workers, and the urban poor, while guaranteeing women's land rights as mandated by the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA).
- The President must: a) order the National Police and Armed Forces (POLRI–TNI) to halt repressive actions in agrarian conflict areas, release criminalized peasants, indigenous peoples, women, activists, and students; b) withdraw POLRI–TNI from food programs; and, c) return control of agriculture, food systems, livestock, aquaculture, and fisheries to peasants, fisherfolks, and indigenous peoples.
- The President must freeze the Land Bank and impose moratoriums on plantation, forestry, and mining permits (HGU, HPL, HGB, HTI, location permits, mining permits/IUP), as well as land acquisition for National Strategic Projects (PSN), Special Economic Zones (KEK), Food Estates, National Tourism Strategic Areas (KSPN), and the new capital (IKN) — all of which have fueled agrarian conflicts, forced evictions, and environmental destruction. Concessions overlapping with community lands must be immediately returned under agrarian reform.
- The President and the House of Representatives must prioritize State and regional budgets (APBN/ APBD) for land redistribution, agrarian conflict resolution, infrastructure development, agricultural technology, access to capital, fertilizer subsidies, fuel (diesel) subsidies, seed provision, and the strengthening of enterprises owned by peasants, fisherfolk, and indigenous peoples in the context of agrarian reform and rural development; and,
- The President must immediately develop and support the industrialization of agriculture, plantations, fisheries, livestock, aquaculture, and marine resources in ways that strengthen people's production centers, promote collective ownership (*gotong royong*) by peasants, fisherfolks, and laborers, and are aligned with the People's Economy Model Rooted in Agrarian Reform (EKORA). This approach is essential to achieving social justice, poverty eradication, food sovereignty, and rural social transformation. ■

Acknowledgment

KPA appreciates the support of its partner-communities and CSOs in providing data and contributing to data analysis.

The 2025 Land and Resource Conflict Monitoring (LRCM) Report reveals how national goals and strategic programs in Indonesia under Prabowo-Gibran administration have intensified land conflicts, displacement, and repression particularly among peasants, indigenous peoples, & rural communities, and prompting widespread public resistance & protests across the country. A total of 341 cases of ongoing land and resource conflicts in 2025 were covered, involving 914,574.96 hectares, and affecting 123,612 households. This underscores the urgent need to realign agrarian reform with its constitutional mandate, and inclusive, people-centered principles.

