Bangladesh

Summary

In 2011, a new land use policy was tabled for discussion in the Parliament of Bangladesh. If passed, this would supersede the 2001 National Land Use Policy that critics found weak. In the meantime, determined land rights activists have maintained their position that agrarian and land reform requires radical, structural change in land ownership. Preconditions have to be addressed before the actual work can start to resolve the complexity of longstanding, core issues in agrarian reform. These issues are: (i) the distribution of khas agricultural land among the poor and landless, (ii) the limited land rights of the religious and ethnic minorities, (iii) women’s access to land, and (iv) the fishing community’s access to water bodies.

The major factors hindering the implementation of agrarian reform include: (i) insufficient and confusing laws and legal dispute settlement bodies, (ii) an inefficient administration system that churns out dual or multiple land ownership documents, and (iii) an expanding shrimp cultivation industry that edges out small farmers in favor of big shrimp farms. Urbanization poses severe challenges as well, drawing two different crowds. They are the landless seeking employment and livelihood, and the resource-rich land grabbers seeking opportunities to own land rising in value.

The role of civil society including peasants’ organizations, non-government organizations, and other organizations, has never been

List of Acronyms used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARB</td>
<td>Agrarian Reform Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGOC</td>
<td>Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALRD</td>
<td>Association for Land Reform and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRDAP</td>
<td>Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Enemy Property Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRDI</td>
<td>Land Reform Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRMT</td>
<td>Land Reform Monitoring Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWA</td>
<td>Land Watch Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-government organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPFII</td>
<td>United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPA</td>
<td>Vested Property Act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An abridged version of the paper, “Land Reform Monitoring Report: Bangladesh”, prepared by Dr. Abul Barkat for the Association for Land Reform and Development (ALRD)
fully recognized in government policies. Nonetheless, NGOs have formed networks with international support groups like ANGOC to drive their goals forward. The exercise of constructing the Land Reform Development Index (LRDI) and the Land Reform Monitoring Tool (LRMT) is the first of its kind in the country. It has been found of practical value in monitoring the directions of land reform. Furthermore, it makes it possible to identify areas (by block components, variables, and indicators) of priority interventions and advocacy towards pro-poor land reform.

**Monitoring Indicators**

The two broad blocks framing the issue of land reform are the input block comprising budget and land policies, and the outcome block, comprised of land tenure and access to land.

The key variables and indicators are shown on the table on the page 54.

Bangladesh has proposed a final monitoring tool and its use is discussed in the body of the report. Given this new tool and research findings, several suggestions are being raised for the consideration of key actors in agrarian reform. These are:

**Government**

- Share the land reform development index and the associated monitoring scheme and tools with the relevant persons/departments in the government and the academe.

**NGOs and partners**

- Share the land reform development index and the monitoring scheme and tools with land-rights based NGOs working in the field.
- Organize an expert group meeting to work out an expected ideal situation/normative scenario for each indicator by time deadline (e.g., reduce the number of people killed/100,000 population by 10 times by the year 2015, and so on).
- Organize large-scale dissemination meeting (seminar, conference) to sensitize all relevant persons both at home and abroad including development partners.
- Continue more research on this endeavor for further refinement and consensus building involving the core team members deployed by ANGOC.

**Context: Status of land reform**

Limited access to land by the poor and rising inequality in society continues to confront 66% of the total population of Bangladesh (or 99 million people).

Central to agrarian reform are issues that have become harder to resolve given the land ownership structure. These issues are:

- the distribution of *khas* agricultural land among the poor and landless,
- the limited land rights of the religious and ethnic minorities,
- women’s access to land, and
- fishing community’s access to water bodies
The nature of urbanization constitutes another significant dynamic of poverty and access to land. Marginal farmers and those rendered landless migrate to the cities in search of livelihood. Urban sprawl is consequently driving land prices up and increasing the incidence of land grabbing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input Block</th>
<th>Outcome Block</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget</strong></td>
<td><strong>Land Tenure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agrarian Reform Budget</td>
<td>• Land disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• R &amp; D expenditure in agriculture</td>
<td>- No. of people killed, detained or harassed/100,000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Share in Official Development Assistance (ODA) in agriculture</td>
<td>- No. of cases received, investigated, adjudicated/100,000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- No. of land grabbing cases, percentage of area of land grabbed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Average time in years for dispute resolution; annual time loss to disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (Annual) Monetary loss associated with land dispute/ litigation; (Annual) Loss of asset due to litigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Laws and Policies</strong></td>
<td><strong>Evictions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• On land use</td>
<td>- No. of households evicted/ displaced from farms/100,000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• For marginalized groups</td>
<td>- No. of households becoming totally homeless due to eviction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• On foreign investment in land</td>
<td><strong>Access to Land</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ownership</strong></td>
<td>• Ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ownership by category according to size of landholdings and according to income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Percentage of farmers having effective ownership of government-distributed khas land (satisfying all 3 indicators)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Percentage of total khas land distributed among landless farmers/cultivators/peasantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tenancy Rights</strong></td>
<td><strong>Landlessness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Percentage of sharecroppers and percentage of sharecroppers with legal documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Percentage of contract farmers’ area in relation to total agricultural area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Landlessness</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Land ownership or the lack of it has largely determined the socio-economic divide. During the last 20 years, the total population has increased by 40 million with majority being poor (32% of the total population). Over half of the poor are agriculture workers; most are landless and what they earn is spent on food. In sharp contrast, across the divide are
the rich (2.7% of total population) who own large landholdings and other assets.

Land ownership status also determines both education and health divides, and more so the gender divide. Existing laws of inheritance, patriarchal values, and social practices perpetuate discrimination against women.

Widespread land grabbing victimizes many among the 32 different ethnic minority groups (1.2% of total households). About one million Hindu households have lost their 2.1 million acres (850,000 ha) because of the enlistment of their property under the Vested Property Act (VPA).\footnote{VPA continued as the Enemy Property Act (EPA) enacted during Indo-Pakistani War in 1965. Local influential people and land officials have maintained the reasons and complex mechanisms that uphold the VPA.}

Poor fishers’ access to khas-water-bodies is highly restricted, affecting the livelihood of about 38 million people. At best, 5% of the total 830,356 acres (336,000 ha) of khas-water-bodies available have been distributed among the poor, on lease basis. The fishers also have to contend with a complex and exploitative marketing system that involves six different intermediaries who benefit most from the value chains.

Shrimp cultivation in the coastal areas covers about 2 million ha and involves 1.5 million persons. The shrimp export industry has grown rapidly, contributing 10% to 12% of the country’s total export. The poor producers, however, have not benefited from this economic development; on the contrary, they have been made vulnerable to loss of property rights to scrupulous businessmen.

Conceptual Framework and selected variables and indicators

In the construction of a Land Reform Development Index (LRDI), the two broad blocks used to frame the issue of land reform were the input block comprising budget and land policies, and the outcome block, comprising land tenure and access to land.

Data pertaining to the input block was obtained directly from official government sources and in some cases, estimated. For the outcome block, data came mainly from relevant research studies. Some data from secondary sources were re-estimated to suit the purpose of the indicator; in other cases, due to unavailability of relevant data, expert judgment was sought.

There are six indicators for the input block falling under budget and policy/laws. For the outcome block, the five indicators falling under land tenure and access to land are specified further into 21 indicators.

Findings and Analysis

Input Indicators

1. Budget

i. Agrarian reform budget

There is no such budgetary heading as “agrarian reform budget” (ARB) in Bangladesh. The precise amount of ARB is not available, neither in revenue nor in development budget. What is contained in the national budget of the last financial year (2010-2011) is a declaration that 5,534 acres (2,250 ha) of khas land will be distributed among 34,352 landless households during the year.
This specification is a first in the history of Bangladesh. It is important therefore to obtain the data from sources at the Land Ministry and Ministry of Finance, not only on the ARB amounts but also financial outlays for all key components of land reform.

ii. R&D expenditure in agriculture as percentage of total agricultural budget and agricultural GDP

The total amount of R&D expenditure in FY 2010-2011 is Tk1,850 million ($26 million). The estimated R&D expenditure in agriculture is 2.26% of the agriculture budget and 0.12% of the agricultural GDP.

iii. ODA in agriculture

In FY 2008–2009, the total ODA was $1,794.9 million, of which agriculture’s share was $30.1 million. Therefore, the share of ODA in agriculture is 1.68%. The actual share may be higher because a part of ODA (“Rural development and institutions” with $57 million) can be attributed to ODA in agriculture, but to what extent it is difficult to ascertain.

2. Land Policies

Land policies pertaining to land reform are weak, both in terms of policy diversity and implementation mechanisms. Because the National Land Use Policy (2001) was a weak one, a new land use policy is now under discussion in Parliament. Specific policies for marginalized groups, namely for indigenous peoples, women, and fishers, and policies or guidelines on foreign investment in land are non-existent. However, various laws and policies related to distribution of khas land do exist. However, implementation is unsatisfactory because, so far, only 12% of the total agricultural khas land has been distributed among the rural poor. The rest are in the hands of land grabbers with powerful connections.

Outcome Indicators

Land tenure - Variables and indicators

There are a number of indicators for land disputes and evictions, for which relevant values have been estimated based mainly on research studies published between 2002 and 2008.

1. Land disputes

Land dispute has been measured using 12 indicators. Indicator-wise values with associated implications are presented as follows.

   i. Number of people killed per 100,000 population

   In 2002, the estimated total number of deaths attributed to land litigation would be 32,073. Considering the 2002 population size of Bangladesh, the ratio comes to 25.1 deaths per 100,000 population. This indicator is a tricky one because ideally speaking, in a smooth, peaceful land reform endeavor, the ratio of killings should drop; however, in a real life situation where land is scarce and where a huge amount of distributable khas land is captured by land grabbers, the ratio of deaths (per 100,000 population)
may increase (in the initial phase of reform).

\textit{ii. Number of people detained per 100,000 population}

The estimated total number of people detained due to land dispute/litigation would be 1.18 million in 2002. This means a ratio of 921 persons detained per 100,000 population.

\textit{iii. Number of persons harassed per 100,000 population}

The estimated total number of people harassed due to land dispute/litigation would be 26.3 million in 2002. The ratio comes to 2,071 persons harassed per 100,000 population. It is important to note that the number of persons harassed due to land disputes/litigation depends mainly on three factors: the number of land dispute/litigations, number of persons involved in each dispute/litigation, and average years of litigation mitigation time (e.g., in Bangladesh, the total number of land litigation at any time is 1.4 million; on average 45 persons are involved in each litigation, and the average mitigation period is 9.5 years).

\textit{iv. Number of land-related cases received per 100,000 population}

The annual number of new land-related cases (law suits) is 63,158. This means 206 cases per 100,000 population. This ratio is relatively high due to high dependence on land as well as stiff competition for access to and ownership of land. Unless land-related legal and administrative reforms coupled with re-distributive land reform are pro-actively pursued, this ratio is bound to go upwards in an increasingly over-populated Bangladesh.

\textit{v. Number of land-related cases investigated per 100,000 population}

Extrapolation based on research findings shows a ratio of 51 cases investigated per 100,000 population. Note that only 25% of cases are investigated within a year of filing. This might explain why it takes an average of 9.5 years to mitigate land litigation.

\textit{vi. Number of land-related cases adjudicated per 100,000 population}

Based on the relevant research findings, the number of cases adjudicated has been extrapolated using information on the rate of disposal and on how long land disputes (litigation, suits) are pending in various types of court. Extrapolation shows a ratio of 82 land-related cases adjudicated per 100,000 population.

\textit{vii. Number of cases of land grabbing - not available}

Land grabbing is rampant in Bangladesh. Based on expert judgment, it has been estimated that the annual number of land grabbing cases is over 10,000.
viii. Percentage of area of land grabbed

It has been estimated by Dr. Abul Barkat that the area of land grabbed would be equivalent to 27% of all agricultural land and 16% of total land area in Bangladesh. This is a relatively high incidence.

ix. Average time in years for land dispute resolution

On average, it takes 9.5 years to resolve a land dispute—11.4 years for civil suits, 7.9 years for criminal suits, and 7.5 years for revenue suits (all are land-related disputes/litigation).

x. Annual loss of time due to disputes – not available

Extrapolation can be done based on the annual number of land-related pending cases (2.5 million cases), number of persons involved in each case (as plaintiff, defendant, their family members, and witnesses; 45 persons per case), and average loss of hours per year per person involved (15 hours per year per person). These show that the annual loss of time due to land disputes amounts to 1,687 million hours (or equivalent to 211 million work days).

xi. Annual monetary loss associated with land dispute/litigation

The estimated annual amount of monetary loss associated with land disputes/litigation is Tk248,599 million ($3,824.6 million) in 2002.

xii. Annual loss of asset due to land disputes/litigation

The study titled “Political Economy of Land Litigation in Bangladesh” provides data on this indicator. The estimated amount of annual loss of assets attributable to land litigation is Tk115,195 million ($1,772 million in 2002).

2. Evictions

This variable under the “land tenure” component has been measured using two indicators. Estimated values on these two indicators with associated implications are presented below.

i. Number of households evicted/displaced from farms per 100,000 population - not available

In order to estimate the annual number of households evicted/displaced from farms, a set of assumptions has been deployed, which includes 25 million rural households, and 1% annual eviction/displacement rate of rural farm households. Based on these, the approximate number of households evicted/displaced would be 250,000 annually, or over 200 households per 100,000 population. The actual number (ratio per 100,000 population) could be higher than this estimate because of displacement due to climate change and natural calamities (not included in the estimation).
ii. Number of households becoming totally homeless due to eviction – not available

Based on informed judgment, it has been estimated that in 2008, over 5,000 households became totally homeless due to eviction.

Access to Land - Variables and indicators

This outcome component of land reform is the sum total of a) ownership, b) tenancy rights, and c) landlessness.

1. Land ownership

Land ownership has been measured using three indicators:

i. Ownership by category according to size of landholdings and income

Agriculture Census provides land ownership statistics by five landholding size categories, namely: landless, marginal, small, medium, and large. Census data from 1996 shows that land ownership is highly skewed with large landowners (only 2.1% of all rural households) owning 17.3% of all agricultural land while majority (70% of landless and marginal farmer households) own at best 15% of total agricultural land. Officially, almost all landless people live below the poverty line.

ii. Percentage of farmers having effective ownership of government-distributed khas land

This indicator shows the effective retention rate of land ownership among recipients of khas with reference to the owner possessing the deed in hand, the land itself (possession right), and the ownership over crops (right to harvest). Research shows that only 46% farmers have effective ownership over those lands, reflecting a high non-retention rate at 54%.

iii. Percentage of total khas land distributed among landless farmers/peasantry

As of 2001, at best 20% of total khas agricultural land had been distributed among landless farmers. Although the Agricultural Khas Land Management and Settlement Policy 1997 requires the distribution of khas annually, the low achievement implies that: first, a huge amount of khas land (80% of all khas) remains undistributed; and second, this huge amount of khas land is lying with the land grabbers. Both of these are core issues of land reform.

2. Tenancy rights

i. Number of sharecroppers

The number of sharecroppers is on the rise, from 7,985,079 in 2008 to 12.1 million in 2009. Of these, less than 1% have legal documents. The reasons for the increase in numbers are:

• the high input cost and low market access that discourages poor-landless-marginal farmers to continue with farming, preferring
to engage in non-agricultural activities or in informal sector jobs;

- many relatively large landowners disinterested in cultivating land themselves, switching to non-agricultural activities; these landowners therefore, lease-out their agricultural land to the sharecroppers; and
- small and medium landowners interested to lease-in land from the relatively poor and relatively large landowners.

**ii. Percentage of sharecroppers with legal documents**

Estimates based on informed judgment show that less than 1% of the sharecroppers in Bangladesh, have legal documents as sharecroppers. However, the Land Reform Law, 1984 has the provision of giving legal documents to the sharecroppers. Advocacy by ALRD and other land-rights NGOs and civil society may help accelerate the process of providing legal documents to the sharecroppers.

**iii. Percentage of contract farmers’ area in relation to total agricultural area – not available**

Experts opine that agricultural land under contract farming (for tobacco, shrimp cultivation, and the rich leasing-in from the poor) is on the rise. Estimates based on informed judgment show that the area under contract farming will not exceed 5% of the total agricultural area. The issue of contract farming deserves serious thinking because of the resulting injustice on and impoverishment of the farmers and environmental deterioration. Contract farming for tobacco in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, for example, is a gross encroachment on the land rights of the indigenous peoples.

3. Landlessness

**i. Gini-coefficient**

Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality shows the highly unequal land ownership pattern in Bangladesh. The Gini coefficient is 0.686 (in 2005). Between 2005 and 2010, there has been a reduction in poverty from 40% to 31.5% (Household Income Expenditure Survey, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics). However, the same source reports that while poverty rates have declined, income inequality has increased. Therefore, an inference can be drawn that the Gini coefficient value has increased implying greater land inequality in Bangladesh. If so, this justifies the need for accelerated land reform in Bangladesh.

**Finalizing the monitoring tool**

The land reform development index (LRDI) and land reform monitoring tool (LRMT) is of high utility. It has practical value in monitoring the directions of land reform. This is because of the following reasons.

First, the state of land reform has been envisaged both in terms of inputs (e.g., budget, laws) and outcomes (land tenure and access to land).
Second, both inputs and outcomes have been measured (for the first time) using appropriate indicators under broad variables (e.g., land disputes, evictions, ownership, tenancy, landlessness).

Third, the framework can be used by the government and civil society to track and monitor the status of land reform at any time.

Fourth, using this monitoring framework, it would be possible to identify areas (by blocks, components, variables, and indicators) of priority interventions and advocacy towards pro-poor land reform. For this purpose, the example below (see Figure 1) presents the LRDI for 2010. All stakeholders could find this informative.

The figure shows the tool to monitor the status of land reform as of 2010. This figure should be updated every year or once in two years.

**On analysis:**

a) The overall LRDI is 0.225. In a “best scenario,” LRDI should be close to 1. The 2010 LRDI is closer to “zero,” implying land reform is still at its inception. Therefore, vigorous efforts are needed to accelerate land reform in Bangladesh.

b) Relatively speaking, both the two blocks (broad components) of land reform are lagging much behind the expected level.
Of the two components, the “access to land” block (with transformed value 0.2) is lagging behind the “land tenure” block (0.25 value). This implies that more emphasis should be given on the “access to land” block.

c) Indicators with transformed value, say those equal to or less than 0.02 represent the least addressed domains of land reform. These areas needing aggressive interventions including advocacy efforts are:

- cases of land grabbing (0.05)
- area of land grabbing (0.03)
- average time in years for dispute resolution (0.02)
- annual loss of time due to land disputes (0.02)
- annual monetary loss due to land litigation (0.03);
- percentage of farmers having effective ownership of government distributed land (0.05)
- percentage of total khas land distributed among poor (0.02)
- number of sharecroppers (0.05)
- percentage of sharecroppers with legal documents (0.03)
- percentage of contract farmers’ area out of total agricultural area (0.05)
- Gini coefficient (0.05)

The utility of this exercise shows precisely where to prioritize interventions, that is, where the transformed values are low.

Conclusion

Based on the research and exercises performed in this study, the following recommendations are being made:

Government

a. Share the land reform development index and the associated monitoring scheme and tools with the relevant persons/departments in government and academia.

b. Discuss with the Land Ministry and the relevant bodies under it (DLRS, Land Appeal Board, etc.) the relevant values attributable to the agrarian reform budget.

c. Push for the declaration of the budget for the distribution of khas land to 34,532 landless households as indicated in the National Budget, FY 2010-2011, Ministry of Finance.

d. Discuss with the Board of Investment the development of policies or guidelines for foreign investment.

Donors

At the regional and global level, through ANGOC, LWA, ILC-Asia:

a. Campaign with ADB, World Bank, and other international financing institutions about their role as investors on land.

b. Dialogue with intergovernmental organizations.

d. Dialogue with CIRDAP to institutionalize the land rights agenda at the Asia-Pacific regional level.

**NGOs and partners**

a. Share the land reform development index and the monitoring scheme and tools with land-rights-based NGOs.

b. Organize an expert group meeting to work out an expected ideal situation/normative scenario for each indicator by time deadline (e.g., reduce number of people killed/100,000 population by 10 times by the year 2015, and so on).

c. Organize large-scale dissemination meeting (seminar, conference) to sensitize all relevant persons—both at home and abroad including the development partners of ALRD. Use publications, seminars, dialogues, trainings (for ALRD’s partners), radio, TV spot, ALRD’s newsletter, and website tools as communication medium.

d. Continue more research on this endeavor for further refinement and consensus building involving the core team members deployed by ANGOC.

---

**How to prepare the Land Reform Development Index (LRDI) tool**

There is a value for each indicator, as shown in the table below. Convert or transform each value into a scale of ‘0’ to ‘1’, ‘0’ being the lowest value (worse situation) and ‘1’ being the highest value (best situation).

In order to perform the conversion exercise, an ideal or normative value for each indicator needs to be constructed or assumed. For example, under “land disputes” variable, the present obtained/estimated value for the indicator titled “number of people killed (per 100,000 population)” is 25.1. Presuming that a consensus has been reached that in an ideal situation (normative situation), the number of persons killed should be 10 times less than what it is today, i.e., from 25.1 persons killed/100,000 population the figure should go down to 2.51 persons (25.1 ÷ 10) person/100,000 population (most ideal situation, however, should be not 2.51 but ‘0’).

Now, in a 0 to 1 scale, the finally transformed value, as shown in Figure 1, would be 0.1 (2.51 ÷ 25.1). Using this estimation procedure coupled with judgmental normative situation (ideal situation), the transformed values for all 20 indicators (as shown in Figure 1) have been estimated.

The transformed value for a variable is an average value of all indicators representing the variable (e.g., the transformed value for variable “land dispute” is an average of transformed value of 12 indicators under this variable). Similarly, the transformed value for the block/component “land tenure” is an average of the two variables representing this block (variables here are “land tenure” and “evictions”).

And finally, the land reform development index (LRDI) is a simple average of the two blocks/components, namely “land tenure” and the “access to land”. The higher the LRDI the better, while the lower the LRDI, the worse.
References


Barkat. A. S Zaman, S Khan, A Podder, S Hoque, and MT Uddin (2008), Deprivation of Hindu Minority in Bangladesh: Living with Vested Property, Pathak Samabesh: Dhaka


Barkat. A. (2004), Poverty and Access to Land in South Asia: Bangladesh Country Study, Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, UK.


Chowdhury, AM., A. Hakim, and SA. Rashid (1997), "Historical Overview of the Land System in Bangladesh", in Land Vo1.3, No.3., Published by the Association for Land Reform and Development (ALRD), Dhaka.


Government of Bangladesh (1986), Method of Settlement of Agricultural and Nonagricultural Government Khas Land, Ref. No. 8-46/84/24(64), dtd. 6.1.86, Ministry of Land Administration and Land Reforms, Dhaka.


Government of Bangladesh (1987c), Method of Settlement of Khas Agricultural Land Among the Landless, Memo No. 8-46/84/77, dtd. 8.2.87, Ministry of Land Administration and Land Reforms, Dhaka.


